MCP exclusion review packet
Every operation still open in the MCP parity inventory, with a proposed disposition.
This packet lists every operation still open in the MCP parity inventory, with a proposed disposition. It was generated from npm run --silent mcp:coverage to help reviewers; it does not record any decision. Automated tooling must not author exclusion records. An exclusion counts only when a named reviewer records it in src/lib/mcp/catalog/review.json. The record needs a date, a rationale of at least 20 characters, and a safe equivalent where one exists. The schema rejects anything else.
Snapshot (2026-11-09): 72 open operations of 325. Proposed: implement 1, exclude 71. Regenerate the inventory before reviewing. The operation IDs, risks and reasons below come from the registry.
How to record a decision
- Confirm the operation, its risk class and the current reason in the coverage artifact.
- For an exclusion, add an
exclusionobject to the operation inreview.json:reviewer,reviewedAt(YYYY-MM-DD),rationale, andsafeEquivalent(ornull). Keep its status asDENIED_WITH_REASONorUNSUPPORTED_WITH_REASON. - For an implementation, follow the approval batch process in full-parity delivery. Never re-label an operation to raise coverage.
- Run
npm run --silent mcp:coverageand the parity unit tests. The artifact reports the reviewed count asreviewedExclusions.
Blocked on a transactional domain command (no durable receipt or single transaction) (1)
Proposed disposition: Implement.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
updateStatusPage |
R2 | PATCH | Not exposed: disabling a page withdraws the public projection before the transaction (a deliberate privacy guarantee) and no-op updates open no transaction, so an approval cannot be recorded atomically with the effect. |
Superseded by an approval-gated equivalent (1)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
deleteRunbook |
R3 | DELETE | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): native rules forbid deleting a runbook with published versions; use archiveRunbook (approval-gated) instead. |
Exceeds MCP request bounds (1)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
uploadStatusPageAsset |
R2 | POST | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): a base64 image body of up to 2.8 MB exceeds the 64 KiB MCP request bound by design; upload through the native status-page editor. |
Response or binding unsafe for a model (7)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
cancelReportExport |
R2 | POST | Not exposed: cancellation is scoped to the creating API key, and MCP cannot create exports (see createReportExport). | |||
createReportExport |
R2 | POST | Not exposed: exports are bound to an API-key row (ReportExport.apiKeyId, NOT NULL foreign key) and MCP principals have none, so an approved export could never be produced or downloaded. Opening report exports needs a non-additive schema change (nullable ReportExport.apiKeyId plus a grant owner). Safe equivalent: queryReportMetrics and getReportMetrics, bounded side-effect-free reads. | |||
createServiceIntegration |
R2 | POST | Not exposed: the response discloses the new integration key in clear, so it needs a rotation-style workflow that never returns the secret to an agent. | |||
downloadReportDashboardData |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): bulk data download; agents should use getReportDashboardData. | |||
downloadReportExport |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): file export bound to API-key rows MCP principals do not have. | |||
getReportExport |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): exports are bound to API-key rows MCP principals do not have. | |||
previewRunbookExecutionRerun |
R2 | POST | Not exposed: the preview returns a rerun authorization token that would let the holder start execution; a model must never receive it. Proposed exclusion (pending named review); safe equivalent is runbook_prepare_execution with native review. |
Credential and secret material (24)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
activateRunbookSigningIdentity |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
configureNotificationProvider |
R3 | PUT | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
createRunbookAgentEnrollment |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
createRunbookSecret |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getIntegrationCredentialState |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getNotificationProvider |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getNotificationProviderDiagnostics |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookAgentEnrollment |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookSecret |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
grantRunbookSecret |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
issueServiceAccountToken |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listNotificationProviders |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookSecretGrants |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookSecretUsage |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookSecrets |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookSigningIdentities |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
retireRunbookSigningIdentity |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
revokeRunbookSecretGrant |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
revokeServiceAccountToken |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
rotateIntegrationCredentials |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
rotateRunbookSecret |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
rotateWebPushKeys |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
stageRunbookSigningIdentity |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
testNotificationProvider |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. |
Identity and access administration (11)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
administerUser |
R3 | PATCH | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
createServiceAccount |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
createUserInvitation |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
deleteServiceAccount |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getServiceAccount |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getUserAdministration |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getUserDependencies |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getUserInvitation |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getUserInvitationPolicy |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listServiceAccounts |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
renewUserInvitation |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. |
Runbook execution infrastructure (agents and pools) (16)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
checkRunbookAgentPoolDeletion |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
createRunbookAgentPool |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
deleteRunbookAgentPool |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookAgent |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookAgentConfiguration |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookAgentPolicyStatus |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getRunbookAgentPool |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookAgentPoolMembers |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookAgentPools |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
listRunbookAgents |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
removeRunbookAgentPoolMember |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
retireRunbookAgentPool |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
revokeRunbookAgent |
R3 | POST | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
setRunbookAgentPoolMember |
R3 | PUT | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
updateRunbookAgentConfiguration |
R3 | PATCH | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
updateRunbookAgentPool |
R3 | PATCH | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. |
Audit evidence (3)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
createAuditExport |
R3 | POST | Not exposed: an audit export is owned by an ApiKey row (AuditExport.apiKeyId, NOT NULL foreign key) and an MCP principal has none, so an approved export could never be created, read back or downloaded; the file carries actor emails and IP addresses the MCP projection must remove, so it would not be the reviewed artefact anyway. Opening it needs a non-additive schema change (nullable apiKeyId plus a grant owner). Safe equivalent: listAuditLogs (sensitive read, paged, email and IP removed). | |||
downloadAuditExport |
R3 | GET | Not exposed: downloads an unredacted audit file (actor emails, IP addresses) owned by an ApiKey row that MCP principals do not have (see createAuditExport). Safe equivalent: listAuditLogs. | |||
getAuditExport |
R3 | GET | Not exposed: reads an audit export owned by an ApiKey row that MCP principals do not have (see createAuditExport). Safe equivalent: listAuditLogs. |
Personal data and personal paging settings (5)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
getMyNotificationPreferences |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
getStatusPageSubscriber |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): subscriber personal data; use getStatusPageSubscriberStats. | |||
listStatusPageSubscribers |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): subscriber personal data; use getStatusPageSubscriberStats. | |||
removeStatusPageSubscriber |
R3 | DELETE | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. | |||
updateMyNotificationPreferences |
R3 | PATCH | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. |
Configuration that can carry endpoint secrets or access controls (3)
Proposed disposition: Exclude.
| Operation | Risk | Method | Current reason | Reviewer | Date | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
getChatOpsConfiguration |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): ChatOps configuration contains webhook URLs whose path is itself a credential. | |||
getIntegration |
R2 | GET | Proposed exclusion (pending named review): integration configuration can carry endpoint secrets; use listIntegrations and getIntegrationUsage. | |||
getStatusPagePrivacy |
R3 | GET | Credential, personal-data or infrastructure boundary restricted to native administration. |
Last updated for v2.2.0
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